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UTAH CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES
FOR INTERPRETATION

Constitutional Provision

Article 1, Section 18, Utah Constitution:

"No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed."

Statutes Interpreted

49-9a-4. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended:

11

. . . Nothing in this act shall require any political
subdivision or educational institution to be covered
by this chapter."

49-9a-8. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended:

"Disabilities covered by this chapter or retirement act.
All covered disabilities with a date of disability on or
after the effective date of this act shall be administered
under this act. Disabilities commencing before the effective
date of this act shall be administered under the provisions
of Chapter 10, Title 49. In no event, may a disability be
covered under both Chapter 10, Title 49 and this act."

-iii-

49-10-1. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended:

". . . The legislature of the state of Utah reserves
to itself and to its successors the right to amend or
terminate this act and the retirement system herein
created."

49-10-28. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended.

"Disability benefits - Requirements for eligibility Payment for medical services and advice rendered to board.
A member shall be entitled to receive disability benefits
upon approval of the retirement board after medical examination . . . ":

-iv-
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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This Court's jurisdiction is based on Utah Code Annotated
§ 78-2-2(2) and (5), 78-2a-4 and Rule 42 of the Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Appellant Glen J. Ellis is appealing from an adverse ruling by
the Utah Court of Appeals which sustained the Third District Court and
Utah State Retirement Board in denying Ellis a disability retirement
benefit.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1-

Is Ellis eligible for a disability retirement benefit under

either U.C.A. § 49-10-28 or § 49-9a-8?

2-

To what extent may the Legislature modify and substitute

benefits in a retirement system and apply those modifications and substitutions to persons who have not met all the conditions precedent to
receiving a retirement benefit?
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES
1-

Article 1, Section 18 of the Utah Constitution.
"No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligations of contracts shall be passed."

2-

Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-4 - See Argument Point II for text.

3-

Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-8 - See Argument Point II for text.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

The Nature of the Case.
This case involves a claim by a local government employee for

disability retirement benefits under Utah disability and retirement
statutes.

The employee, Glen J. Ellis, argues that he is eligible for

a disability benefit under a statutory provision which the administrator
of the disability program, the Utah State Retirement Board, claims does
not apply to Ellis.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Courts.
Following the Utah State Retirement Board's denial of Ellis'

request for a disability benefit, Ellis commenced legal action in the
Fourth District Court, then changed to the Third District Court pursuant
to a motion made by Respondent.
The Third District Court granted Respondent Board's Motion to
Dismiss and denied Ellis' Motion for Summary Judgment.
-2-

Ellis then appealed to the Utah State Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the lower court decision.

Ellis subsequently filed a Petition

for Rehearing with the Court of Appeals, which was denied.
Ellis finally petitioned for, and was granted, a writ of Certiorari
by the Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The sequence of legislative enactments leading to the controversy
in question, and the history of Ellis' participation in the retirement
and disability systems, provide the basis for the determination of this
case.
Prior to July 1, 1983, provisions of the Utah State Retirement Act
governed eligibility requirements for receiving a disability benefit.
Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-1 et seq.
On July 1, 1983, a new disability retirement program, "The Utah
Public Employees 1 Disability Act" became effective and governed all
disabilities which occurred on or after July 1, 1983.

Utah Code

Ann. § 49-9a-l et seq.
Glen Ellis was employed by Provo City and was covered by the Utah
State Retirement Act until January 1, 1985, when he elected to exempt
himself from coverage under the system as permitted for certain local
government employees pursuant to law.
On April 28, 1986, Ellis applied for a disability retirement under
the provisions of the Utah State Retirement Act.
On February 16, 1987, after a hearing on Ellis' request for a disability benefit, the Utah State Retirement Board, through its executive
officer, notified Ellis that he was not eligible for either:
-3-

1-

benefits under the pre-1983 Retirement Act disability provi-

sions, since his disability was in 1986, three years after the new
Disability Act became effective, or
2-

benefits under the new Disability Act, since Provo City, Ellis'

employer, had exercised its statutory option and elected not to participate in coverage under the new Disability Act.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Ellis is not eligible for a disability benefit under the pre-July
1, 1983 Retirement Act, since (a) his alleged disability occurred in
1986 and he continued to work at his job for several months after seeking
disability, and (b) Ellis had exempted himself from the Retirement Act
in 1985.
Ellis is not eligible for a disability benefit under the new
Disability Act, effective July 1, 1983, since (a) he does not meet the
new eligibility requirements under that Act, and (b) his employing unit
elected not to participate in the new Act, and no contributions were made
to provide coverage.
Since Ellis has not satisfied all the conditions precedent to
receiving a retirement benefit, his rights are not vested to the extent
that the Legislature cannot make reasonable adjustments to those
benefits (including the eligibility conditions for obtaining those
benefits), and apply them to Ellis and all others similarly situated.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. SINCE ELLIS" DISABILITY OCCURRED IN 1986, THE
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH PUBLIC EMPLOYEES DISABILITY ACT,
WHICH APPLIES TO ALL DISABILITIES OCCURRING ON OR AFTER
JULY 1, 1983, GOVERN HIS DISABILITY BENEFITS. ELLIS IS
INELIGIBLE FOR A BENEFIT UNDER THAT ACT.
-4-

The provisions of the 1983 Disability Act. which governed the
disposition of this case in the Utah Court of Appeals, provide:
§ 49-9a-4. All employers participating in the Utah State
Retirement System may cover their employees under this act.
Nothing in this act shall require any political subdivision
or educational institution to be covered by this act.
§ 49-9a-8. All covered disabilities with a date of disability
on or after the effective date of this act shall be administered
under the provisions of Chapter 10, Title 49. In no event, may
a disability be covered under both Chapter 10, Title 49 and this
act. (The effective date of the act was July 1, 1983. Laws of
Utah 1983, Ch. 223, § 2 ) .
Ellis claimed disability in 1986.

His employer, Provo City, had

exercised its statutory option under § 49-9a-4 and had elected not to
participate in the disability plan offered by the 1983 Disability Act.
Yet, despite these facts, Ellis asserts, and would have this Court hold,
that since the Legislature did not expressly repeal the disability
benefits offered by the Retirement Act under Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-28
(1981) when it enacted the 1983 Disability Act, that he should be
allowed to retire under the Retirement Act, even though it is only for
those whose disabilities commenced prior to July 1, 1983.
The Court of Appeals understood the ramifications of this disturbing argument and offered a clear analysis of the interrelationship of
the disability plans:
"Thus, in 1983 the Legislature, by clear express
language provided that two disability retirement
systems would co-exist in Utah. The earlier 1967
Retirement Act would continue to cover disabilities commencing before the effective date of the
1983 Disability Act. However, all those whose
disabilities commenced after the 1983 Disability
Act became effective would be governed by the
later Disability Act." (See Opinion, Exhibit
"A" Page 3, paragraph 3.)
-5-

Thus, the 1983 Disability Act governs Ellis1 disability retirement
benefits, and under that Act, Ellis is ineligible for benefits.

First,

Provo City elected not to participate in the plan, as allowed by Utah
Code Ann. § 49-9a-4 and established its own disability program for its
employees with the money it saved from not contributing to either of
the disability programs offered under Title 49, Chapters 9a and 10.
In any event, even if Provo City had participated in the plan, Appellant
would still be ineligible because he was not "totally disabled" as
required by the Act, a fact conceded by Ellis in the courts below.

(See

Opinion, page 1.)
While not determinative of the outcome of this petition, the
Respondent Board offers some observations on certain allegations made
by Ellis.
First; he argues that the repeal of § 49-10-28 has resulted in a
windfall to the board "which no longer has to pay out anything for
disability retirement."
specious.

This argumentative statement is clearly

All disability retirees who properly met the requirements

of § 49-10-28; i.e., they were disabled prior to January 1, 1983, continue to receive disability retirement payments from the board from the
contributions made to that plan.

Second, his characterizations of a

legislative recodification of retirement laws and other amendments
effectuated in the 1987 General Session (H.B. 150) as "vacillations of
the Retirement Board" (Brief of Appellant P. 9) serve no useful purpose
here.
-6-

POINT II. ELLIS HAS NOT SATISFIED ALL THE CONDITIONS
PRECEDENT TO RECEIVING A DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFIT.
HIS RIGHTS TO THE BENEFIT ARE THEREFORE NOT VESTED AND
THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS UNDER THE SYSTEM MAY BE REASONABLY ALTERED BY LEGISLATIVE ACTION.
Ellis argues that he has a contractual vested right to a disability
benefit under the pre-1983 law pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-28.
But since he was, by his own admission, not disabled in 1983, he is in
essence arguing that the Legislature had no right to enact legislation
taking away his right to a disability retirement benefit under the
Retirement Act.

This is so although Appellant conceded in answer to

a direct question from the District Court (Judge Noel) that the
Legislature could do so but it was done by Mr. Hunsaker.
There is no question that if Ellis had met all the conditions for
obtaining a disability retirement benefit under the Retirement Act his
retirement would have contractually "vested", and this case would have
been resolved under Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-8 at the administrative
level, but Ellis neyer

did meet all the conditions for obtaining the

disability benefit under the Retirement Act and his disability did not
commence prior to July 1, 1983, and the date of the commencement of
disability is a condition for receiving a disability benefit.
The Court of Appeals in this case offers an interesting analysis
of the two conflicting lines of authority governing the rights of
employees under retirement systems.

Utah numbers itself among those

states which adhere to the contractual line of authority.

Beginning

with Driggs v. Utah Teachers Retirement Board, 105 Utah 417, 142 P.2d
657 (1943), the Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that when an
-7-

employee has satisfied all conditions precedent to receiving his benefits, then the employee has a "vested right" in those benefits provided
by law at the time of retirement and subsequent legislative enactments
cannot reduce or diminish that benefit.

See Hansen v. Public Employees

Retirement System Board of Administration, 122 Utah 44, 246 P.2d 591,
597 (1952); Newcomb v. Ogden City Public School Teachers1 Retirement
Commission, 121 Utah 503, 243 P.2d 941, 947 (1952).
Most recently, this Court had the opportunity to uphold these principles in Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Board, (No. 20734, filed
September 19, 1988) wherein the Court concluded an analysis of the
Legislature's right to modify pension statutes of retired members of
the Public Safety Retirement System, Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-1 et seq,
(Supp. 1985), with the following statement:
"The State may not rescind or modify its
offer after it has been accepted and all
conditions have been satisfied. Id^ at 8.
Those other jurisdictions adhering to the "contractual" theory of determining employee rights agree with this analysis.

See e.g. in Re State

Employees' Pension Plan, 364 A.2d 1228 (Del. 1976); and Miles v.
Tennessee Consolidated Retirement System, 548 S.W. 2d 299 (Tenn. 1977).
Finally, the Utah Court of Appeals noted that reasonable modifications and alterations of the retirement system are acceptable under the
contractual view, as is the case here:
"Under the contractual view, state legislatures
may reasonably alter the terms or modify the
retirement system to improve it or keep it on a
sound basis prior to retirement for the purposes
of maintaining the integrity of the system."
(Opinion P. 6)
-8-

Utah law is thus settled on this issue.

Since Ellis did not

satisfy all the conditions precedent for a disability benefit under
the Retirement Act, his rights are not vested.

The Legislature is thus

permitted to modify, or as is the case here, provide a substantial substitute for, the disability benefits under the Retirement Act, and apply
its provisions to Ellis and all others similarly situated.

As noted in

Respondent's Brief before the Court of Appeals, although Appellant did
raise the question of legislative authority to amend or change the benefits for those already in a system, he did not brief or argue these
matters at any level of Court proceedings below.

Indeed, he specifically

waived them in answer to a direct question from the District Judge, as
heretofore noted.

He should not now be allowed to seek advantage on a

question he waived and hence has not been properly briefed or argued below.
SUMMARY
The Court of Appeals has issued an opinion which is consistent with
well established precedent in this and other jurisdiction which espouse
the "contractual" view determining rights to retirement benefits.
Ellis has no right to a disability benefit under either Utah Code
Ann. § 49-10-28, or § 49-9a-8, since his rights are not vested in the
Retirement Act and he does not meet the eligibility requirements of the
Disability Act.
Ellis has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

M a r k U . Madsen"
Attorney for Respondent
Utah State Retirement Board

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Respondent's Brief to Glen J. Ellis, Attorney for Plaintiff/
Appellant, 60 East 100 South, Suite 102, P. 0. Box 1097, Provo, Utah
84603 and deliver 10 copies to the Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court on
this

/ W ^

day of December, 1988.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Glen J. Ellis,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Utah State Retirement Board,

Case No. 870252-CA

Defendant and Respondent*
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Davidson.

FILED

(cA&sA
BILLINGS, Judge:

Tirfiothy M. Shoa w *~<*+***m
C/rk of tfto Court
.&.*! Cou'T cf Appeals

Plaintiff Ellis appeals from the district court's
decision affirming an administrative denial of his application
for disability retirement benefits. Ellis1 main contention is
that the lower court erred in upholding the administrative
ruling that the 1983 Utah Disability Act rather than the 1967
Utah State Retirement Act governed his claim for disability
benefits. We affirm the district court's judgment.
Ellis was the head of the Provo City Attorney's Office
for over 20 years. According to Ellis' attending physician,
Ellis suffered numerous medical conditions stemming from the
stressful nature of his employment. Consequently, on April 28,
1986, Ellis applied for disability retirement benefits. He was
not totally disabled but, rather, sought less stressful legal
employment.
The Utah State Retirement Board denied Ellis' application
for disability retirement benefits finding the Legislature
replaced the disability plan under which Ellis sought benefits,
see Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-10-1 to -61 (1981), with an optional
plan in 1983, £££ Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-9a-l to -15 (1984), in
which Provo elected not to participate and under which, in any
event, Ellis would not have qualified because he was not
totally disabled.
Ellis objected to the administrative denial of benefits
and sought a formal hearing before che Board. In a hearing

held in February 1987, the Board listened to Ellis and then
requested Ellis to leave the room so the Board could consider
his application. The Board denied Ellis' application for
benefits. In response, Ellis filed a complaint in district
court seeking a review of the Board1s decision. He claimed
that if the Board was correct in finding the Legislature
repealed the retirement plan under which he sought benefits,
then this repeal was unconstitutional. Ellis also challenged
the procedure of the Retirement Board claiming the Board failed
to comply with the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act and the
Open and Public Meetings Act.
The Board moved to dismiss Ellis1 complaint asserting it
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Ellis moved for summary judgment arguing that, as a matter of
law, the 1983 enactment of the long-term disability act did not
repeal the retirement plan under which he sought benefits. The
court granted the Board's motion to dismiss and denied Ellis'
motion for summary judgment. This appeal ensued.
I.
At the outset, we must determine whether the Legislature
replaced the 1967 retirement program under which Ellis sought
and qualified for disability benefits. Since this issue raises
a question of special law, ££S Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 610 (Utah 1983), we must
determine whether the Board's decision falls within the limits
of reasonableness or rationality. Id.
Our analysis of whether the Legislature replaced the
earlier retirement program is best understood against the
background of the relevant statutory history. Between July 1,
1967, and June 30, 1983, state retirement benefits were
governed by the Utah State Retirement Act. Utah Code Ann.
§§ 49-10-1 to -61 (1981)• Section 49-10-28 of tho Retirement
Act provided that a state employee was entitled to disability
benefits provided the employee had worked at least 10 years for
the state and a medical examination determined that the
employee was -physically or mentally incapable of performance
of the usual duties of his employment and should be retired and
the administrator so recommends to the board."
On March 10, 1983, the Legislature enacted the Utah
Public Employees' Disability Act. 1983 Utah Laws ch. 223, § 1
(codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-9a-l to -15 (1984)). The
Legislature did not expressly repeal the Utah State Retirement
Act when it enacted the Disability Act; however, the
Legislature clearly provided that the Disability Act would
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cover all disabilities with a date of disability on or after
the effective date of the Act, namely July 1, 1983. 1983 Utah
Laws ch. 223/ § 2; Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-8 (1984). Provisions
of the Disability Act relevant to the instant case, with our
emphasis added/ provide:
section 49-9a-4: All employers
participating in the Utah state retirement
system may cover their employees under this
act. Nothing in this act shall require any
political subdivision or educational
institution to be covered by this act.
Section 49-99-8: All covered disabilities
with a date of disability on or after the
effective date of this act shall be
administered under this act. Disabilities
commencing before the effective date of this
act shall be administered under the
provisions of Chapter 10. Title 49. In no
event, may a disability be covered under
both Chapter 10, Title 49 and this act.
Thus, in 1983 the Legislature/ by clear, express language
provided that two disability retirement systems would co-exist
in Utah. The earlier 1967 Retirement Act would continue to
cover disabilities commencing before the effective date of the
1983 Disability Act. However, all those whose disabilities
commenced after the 1983 Disability Act became effective would
be governed by the later Disability Act.
In order to receive disability benefits under the
Disability Act, the employee must be totally disabled.
-Totally disabled- is defined by the Disability Act to mean
-complete inability to engage in any gainful occupation which
is reasonable, considering the employee*s education, training
and experience.- Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-3(10) (1984).* The
effective date of the Disability Act was July 1, 1983. 1983
Utah Laws ch. 223, § 2. After July 1, 1983, the Retirement
Board refused to accept contributions for the Chapter 10, Title
49 fund.
1. Ellis concedes he is not -totally disabled- as defined by
the Disability Act and, therefore, does not qualify for
disability benefits under this statutory scheme.

870028-CA
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On appeal, Ellis contends the Legislature did not
impliedly repeal the Utah State Retirement Act when it
subsequently enacted the Disability Act. We agree that the
Legislature did not impliedly repeal the Retirement Act but,
rather, by clear language, it expressly replaced the Retirement
Act with the Disability Act for disability retirements
commencing after the Disability Act's effective date.
We acknowledge the authority governing implied repeals of
legislation. As a general proposition, implied repeals are not
favored and are found only if there is a manifest inconsistency
or conflict between the earlier and later statutes. State v.
Sorensen, 617 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah 1980). Subsequently enacted
statutes relating to the same subject matter as previous
statutes are, if possible, to be construed so as to make the
later enactments harmonious with the former provisions. Stahl
v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980).
Nonetheless,
[W]here a consistent body of laws cannot be
maintained without the abrogation of a
previous law, a repeal by implication of
previous legislation . . . is readily found
in the terms of the later enactment. It is
the necessary effect of the later enactment
construed in the light of the existing law
that ultimately determines an implied
repeal. . . . [W]here a conflict is readily
seen by an application of the later
enactment in accord with [the legislative]
intent, it is clear that the later enactment
is intended to supersede the existing law,
1A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 23.09, at 332
(4th ed. 1985). This is so because when there is an
irreconcilable conflict between the new provision and the prior
statutes relating to the same subject matter, the new provision
is deemed controlling as it is the later expression of the
Legislature. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah
1983).
The foregoing authority, however, is inapplicable as we
are persuaded the Legislature clearly and expressly provided
that the Utah State Retirement Act would continue to govern
disabilities arising before July 1, 1983, the effective date of
the Disability Act, but all those disability retirements
occurring thereafter would be governed by the Disability Act.
Therefore, there is no irreconcilable conflict between the
Retirement Act and the Disability Act as the two acts are

870028-CA
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mutually exclusive. A disability is governed by one statutory
act or the other# but not both* A consistent body of law is
maintained and the Disability Act does not abrogate the
Retirement Act,
The date of Ellis* disability is April 26, 1986, i.e.,
after July 1, 1983, which is the effective date of the
Disability Act. Consequently, the Disability Act governs
Ellis1 disability retirement benefits. However, as previously
mentioned, supra Note 1, Ellis is not "totally disabled" as
required by the Disability Act. Therefore, Ellis is not
entitled to disability benefits under the governing statutory
scheme.
II.
Notwithstanding our holding that Ellis does not qualify
for benefits under either retirement scheme, we must now
determine whether the Legislature's replacement of the
Retirement Act with the Disability Act unconstitutionally
deprived Ellis of vested contractual rights. Ellis contends
that if the Disability Act governs his eligibility for
disability retirement benefits, then he was unconstitutionally
denied his vested contractual rights to an earned disability
pension. Under Utah law, Ellis' argument is without merit.
There are two lines of authority addressing the rights of
retired employees. One line of authority holds that a
retirement plan is a gratuity in which the recipient has no
vested rights and, consequently, is freely terminable at the

employer's option. See, e,g., Kgggan v, Poarfl of Trustees/ 412
111. 430, 107 N.E.2d 702 (1952) (retirement plans which mandate
compulsory participation confer no vested rights upon
recipients because statutes affording such benefits rest upon
the sovereign power of the state and are not in the nature of
contracts between the participant and the state); Roach v.
State Bd. of Retirement. 331 Mass. 41, 116 N.E.2d 850 (1954)
(holding that an employee had no vested rights to pension which
were infringed by the repeal of the pension statute despite
employee's eligibility for retirement prior to repeal); Dallas
v. Trammell. 129 Tex. 150, 101 S.W.2d 1009 (1937) (public
employee has no vested rights in a statutory pension).
The other line of authority adheres to the contractual
view which reasons that once a public employee has fulfilled
all the conditions precedent to receiving retirement benefits,
the employee has certain vested rights which cannot be impaired
by subsequent administrative or legislative enactments. See,
e.g., Yeazell v. Copins, 98 Ariz. 109, 402 P,2d 541 (1965)
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(right to public pension vests upon acceptance of public
employment and laws of state are part of every contract); Betts
v. Board of Admin, of the Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys^ 21
Cal.3d 859, 148 Cal. Rptr. 158, 582 P.2d 614 (1978) (public
employee's pension constitutes an element of compensation, and
a vested contractual right to pension accrues upon acceptance
of employment); In re State Employees' Pension Plan. 364 A.2d
1228 (Del* 1976) (vested contractual rights exist under state
pension law for those public employees who have fulfilled
eligibility requirements); Miles v. Tennessee Consolidated
Retirement Svs.. 548 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1977) (public employee
has contractual right to pension benefits)• Under the
contractual view, state legislatures may reasonably alter the
terms or modify the retirement system to improve it or keep it
on a sound basis prior to retirement for purposes of
maintaining the integrity of the system. Sfifi, e.g.. Betts. 582
P.2d at 617. Once the retirement benefits have vested,
however, the Legislature can modify the plan only upon a
showing that a vital state interest will be protected, Miles.
548 S.W.2d at 305, and only where a substantial substitute is
provided for in lieu of the loss of benefits sustained.
Newcombe v. Ooden City Public School Teacher's Retirement
Comm'n, 121 Utah 503, 243 P.2d 941, 948 (1952).
Utah adheres to the cohtractual line of authority. In
Drioos v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Bd., 105 Utah 417, 142
P.2d 657 (1943), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that an
employee who receives a mere gratuitous allowance awarded for
appreciation of past services has no vested rights in the
allowance and it is terminable at will. I£. at 659. On the
other hand, when a retired employee had made the requisite
contributions and had satisfied all conditions precedent to his
benefits, then the employee had a -vested right" in his
retirement benefits as provided by the statute at the time of
his retirement and a subsequent amendment could not reduce the
amount of benefits to which the employee was entitled. !£. at
663-64.
Since Driqqs, our supreme court has consistently held
that the employee has this vested contractual right only when
he has satisfied all conditions precedent to receiving the
benefit, i.e., he has attained retirement age, or has been
medically disabled. &££ Hansen v- Public Employees Retirement
Svs, Bd. of Admin.. 122 Utah 44, 246 P.2d 591, 597 (1952);
Newcombe v. Ooden City Public School Teachers* Retirement
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Comm'ri, 121 Utah 503, 243 P.2d 941, 947 (1952).2
Based upon the foregoing authority, we are persuaded
Ellis was not deprivedLof vested contractu^l__beneflt.s^Jbeg,ajise
he failed to saTisfy the conditions precedent .to- hi^Ljdl^MIi-tY
retirement~benef iTs, namely ""Ellis had not become disabled and
retired before the Legislature enacted the Disability Act.
Consequently, he was not entitled to benefits under the
governing Disability Act.
III.
Ellis further contends the Retirement Board violated the
Administrative Rulemaking Act3 by failing to comply with rule
making procedures when it determined the Retirement Act had
been replaced by the Disability Act in deciding Ellis'
eligibility for disability benefits. Ellis contends that such
a determination was, in effect, a policy determination subject
to adequate advance notice to all affected parties, an
2. We note, however, that Drioos was slightly modified in
Newcombe. In Newcombe, the court held a statute which dissolved
a statutory pension system invalid as to retired employees.
Newcombe, 243 P.2d at 948. In dictum, however, the court
acknowledged that had the Legislature "attempted to make changes
in local retirement systems for the purpose of strengthening
them, there would be no difficulty in finding authority to
support such action." I&. at 946. To support this dictum, the
court relied on several cases holding that vested rights of
retired employees are not impaired by a reduction in the amount
of the pension payments pursuant to statutes enacted subsequent
to retirement, provided the purpose of such statutes is to
render the retirement pension system actuarially sound.
3. The Administrative Rulemaking Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 63-46a-l to -15 (1986), was significantly revised and amended
in 1987, after the commencement of this action. Accordingly,
our analysis focuses on the administrative provisions in effect
at the time of Ellis' hearing before the Retirement Board.
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opportunity to participate, and an opportunity to comment.4
Any agency subject to the Administrative Rulemaking Act
promulgating a rule must follow the procedures specified. See
Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 773, 775 (Utah 1986)
(interpreting the Utah Rule Making Act, the predecessor to the
Administrative Rulemaking Act). The Administrative Rulemaking
Act requires rule making whenever "agency actions affect a
class of persons" and defines a rule as Ma statement made by an
agency that applies to a general class of persons, rather than
specific persons . . . [which] implements or interprets policy
made by statute . . . ." Utah Code Ann. §§ 63~46a-(3)(a),
-2(8) (1986).5
The critical question, therefore, is whether the
Retirement Board's decision to deny Ellis disability retirement
benefits based upon its interpretation of the language of the
Disability Act amounted to a rule within the meaning of the
Administrative Rulemaking Act. "We acknowledge that there is a
variance of opinion on when an agency is engaged in rule making
and must follow formal rule making procedures, and when an
agency may legitimately proceed by way of adjudication."
Williams, 720 P.2d at 776. See generally 2 K. Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise § 7.2 (2d ed. 1979). "Many rules
are the product of rulemaking, and rulemaking is the part of
the administrative process that resembles a legislature's
enactment of a statute. An order is the product of
adjudication, and adjudication is the part of the
4. The Retirement Board contends that Ellis did not raise the
applicability of the Administrative Rulemaking Act below and,
therefore, is precluded from raising this issue for the first time
on appeal. We disagree. The record indicates that Ellis raised
this issue not only in his amended complaint but also in his
motion for summary judgment.
5. The Retirement Board argues that it is exempt from the
Administrative Rulemaking Act because it is a •'political
subdivision." Since the commencement of this action, the Utah
State Retirement Act was amended and the Legislature decreed that
the Board "shall voluntarily comply" with the provisions of the
Administrative Rulemaking Act. Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-201(4)
(1987). This new language implies that during the period of time
at issue here the Board may indeed have been exempt from the Act's
coverage. But see Utah Attorney General Informal Opinion 86-16
(June 4, 1986), wherein Utah's Attorney General concludes that the
Retirement Board was required to comply with the requirements of
the Administrative Rulemaking Act. Inasmuch as we conclude that
the Board, in any event, complied with the Act, we need not decide
whether it was required to do so.

a

administrative process that resembles a court's decision of a
case.- 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.2, at 4 (2d
ed. 1979).
In Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah
1986), the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the definition of
"rule" contained in the Utah Rule Making Act, the predecessor to
the Administrative Rulemaking Act.6 In Williams, the
petitioners charged the Public Service Commission with failure
to follow proper administrative procedures in concluding that it
did not have jurisdiction to regulate one-way mobile telephone
paging services. The supreme court held that the Commission's
letter stating that no certificate of public convenience and
necessity was required constituted a "rule" and, consequently,
the Commission, when reaching this determination, should have
followed the rule making procedures. !£. at 776. The court
relied on three factors in reaching this conclusion. First, the
Commission's decision was generally applicable. Second, the
letter interpreted the scope of the Commission's statutory
regulatory powers, thus interpreting the law within the meaning
of the Act. Finally, in so acting, the Commission made a
"change in clear law" by reversing its long-settled position
regarding the scope of its jurisdiction and announcing a
fundamental policy change. Id.
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude the Retirement Board
was not engaged in rule making and, therefore, did not have to
adhere to rule making procedural requirements. Rather, the
Board was merely applying the explicit statutory language of the
Disability Act to the facts of Ellis' case. The explicit
language of the Disability Act provides that that Act, not the
Retirement Act, governs all disabilities with a date of
disability after July 1, 1983. Ellis' date of disability is
April 26, 1986. This administrative process does not resemble
the Legislature's enactment of a statute. On the contrary, the
administrative process examined here resembles a court's
decision applying explicit statutory language. The only policy
decision which was generally applicable was made by the
Legislature in its enactment of the Disability Act. The change
in clear law in this instance was promulgated by the
Legislature, not the Retirement Board. Therefore, the
Retirement Board was not compelled to follow the rule making
procedures of the Administrative Rulemaking Act.
6. The court stated that its conclusion would not be any
different had the court been called upon to interpret the
definition of "rule" within the meaning of the subsequently
enacted Administrative Rulemaking Act. Williams. 720 P.2d at
775 n.7.
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IV.
The final issue we address is whether the Retirement Board
violated the Open and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 52-4-1 to -9 (1981)# when it requested Ellis to leave the
room while it deliberated his appeal from the administrative
denial of benefits.
The Open and Public Meetings Act requires that every
"meeting" of a "public body" be open to the public. As used in
this Act, "public body" means "any administrative, advisory,
executive or legislative body of the state or its political
subdivisions which consists of two or more persons that expends,
disburses or is supported in whole or in part by tax revenue and
which is vested with the authority to make decisions regarding
the publicfs business." Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-2(2) (1981).
We are persuaded that the Open and Public Meetings Act is
not applicable to the Retirement Board. First, the Utah State
Retirement Fund is administered as a common trust fund and not
supported by tax revenue. Second, the Retirement Board is not
vested with authority to make decisions regarding the public's
business. The Board administers funds for the benefit of the
beneficiaries and not for the public at large. Hansen v. Utah
State Retirement Bd.. 652 P.2d 1332, 1338 (Utah 1982). When'
Hansen was decided, "[s]ome 80 percent of the beneficiaries
[were] not state employees, but employees of municipalities or
counties." Id. "No state funds [were] appropriated to meet any
administrative costs." id, Ellis' argument that the Board
acted contrary to the Open and Public Meetings Act is without
merit.
Affirmed.

Judith M. Billings, Judge

Richard C. Davidson, Judge
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